This second volume completes the biography of the influential philosopher, following Whitehead's move first from Trinity College, Cambridge to London, and then, at the age of 63, to America, where the focus of his work shifted from mathematics to philosophy. Lowe (philosophy emeritus, Johns Hopkins U.) died in 1988 with this biography not quite completed. Vol.2 was edited and seen through publication by J.B. Schneewind, chairman of the Philosophy Department at Johns Hopkins. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

This book explores three worlds shared by the humans in their collective experiences. It identifies and explores the world of commonsense, the world of religion, and the world of science as three essential dimensions of human experience. The book helps understand that humans can gain comfort and pleasure in commonsense, achieve meaning and purpose from religion, and attain truth and rationality through science. It actively applies theories to and develops theoretical explanations from different domains or situations of human existence. This (...) book is of interest to theorists, researchers, instructors, and students across major academic disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. (shrink)

In the light of partial (mis)understanding, we examine the thesis that concepts are individuated in terms of possession conditions and show that adherents face a fatal dilemma: Either concept‐individuating possession conditions include cases of partially (mis)understood concepts or not. If yes, possession conditions do not individuate concepts. If no, the thesis is too restricted and lacks a minimally satisfactory level of generalization.

El propósito de esta investigación es hacer una relectura histórico-crítica de la Ética de la Liberación como ética de la vida. Este planteamiento se hace desde la memoria política crítica que permitirá ver la influencia que ella ha tenido con otras éticas que hoy pueden agruparse en torno al concepto de convivencia: la ética intercultural, la ética ecológica, la ética de la economía solidaria, la ética de una ciencia construida socialmente y de una tecnología al servicio de las personas, la (...) ética educativa como expresión de apertura y diálogo y no como adoctrinamiento, la ética religiosa separada de todo fanatismo, la ética civil más allá de todo militarismo, la ética del género más allá de toda exclusión. Lo que implica la necesidad de consolidar una ética de la convivencia, como eje central de la cultura y de la vida de los habitantes de América Latina que no es sólo necesario estudiar sino practicar. (shrink)

On the face of it, On Tyranny is a straightforward commentary on Xenophon's dialogue Hiero or Tyrannicus. As such it is a very model of thoroughness and learning. It amply repays careful study, and it goes a long way toward explaining Strauss's influence in training a generation of scholars. The dialogue proper takes up just under 20 pages. Its analysis runs to 90-odd pages, followed by another 30 pages of tightly packed notes that are largely devoted to parallels between the (...) Hiero, Xenophon's teaching as a whole, and the teachings of Plato, of Aristotle and, to a lesser extent, of Cicero. What at first appears as an exercise in textual analysis soon reveals itself as a much broader undertaking: the delineation of the main features of classical political philosophy. Strauss does not mean to deny that differences in perspective, procedure, and even conclusions separate the major representatives of classical political philosophy. He does want to maintain, however, that their agreements are more fundamental than are their differences. But even this is incidental to his main purpose: to understand classical political philosophy for the guidance it might provide in understanding the great moral and political problems that confront us here and now. He conceives of these problems in large measure as the consequence of modern philosophy, of what he calls "the modern project." But modern philosophy cannot be understood on its own terms alone any more than it can be understood by directly confronting it with the phenomena. For it does not owe its most characteristic features to such a confrontation. It owes them, rather, to the fact that, from its very outset, it defined itself in explicit contrast to classical philosophy. Modern philosophy is essentially derivative. It presupposes the tradition it opposes. Classical philosophy, and in particular classical political philosophy, on the other hand "... belongs to the fertile moment when all political traditions were shaken, and there was not yet in existence a tradition of political philosophy." Hence "only in the light of the quarrel between the ancients and the moderns can modernity be understood. By rediscovering the urgency of this quarrel we return to the origins of modernity." It further follows from this line of reasoning that the quarrel must be re-kindled if we are once again to gain access to the phenomena themselves. To this end historical studies become necessary which do not presuppose that the whole issue has, for all intents and purposes, been settled in favor of the moderns. The most basic and most constant assumption of Strauss's historical studies is, therefore, the assumption that classical philosophy is truer than are any of the teachings that criticize or reject it. The passion and the inventiveness with which he defends this assumption sufficiently prove that he does not put it forward merely for reasons of method or of rhetoric. Yet it seems to fall short of being his settled belief. By stressing his agreements with the ancients and his disagreements with the moderns, by holding the moderns responsible for the great problems that face us while calling for a restoration of classical political philosophy, he fosters the impression that his own views coincide fully with those of classical political philosophy. But even if classical political philosophy spoke with a single clear voice, the fact remains that "no competent man of our age would regard as simply true the complete teaching of any thinker of the past." Presumably only someone who thinks himself competent would issue such a warning. (shrink)

Introduction.- Conclusions.- Chronology.- Political activities of Barlow.- Political writings of Barlow.- An evaluation.- Bibliography.- Appendix: The conspiracy of kings, by Joel Barlow.

This article is about reductionism; as a tendency of thought, reductionism tells us that the hole can be explained as the sum of its parts. From this principle, one can deduce that the properties and laws of complex systems can be explained by the laws and properties of simple systems. On the other ..

The story is frequently told about how with the publication of De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium (On the Revolutions of the Celestial Spheres) in 1543 Nicolaus Copernicus (d. 1543) looked beyond the vanity of human self-centeredness and perceived that Earth was just one of several planets revolving around the sun. In doing so, he triggered the modern scientific revolution as people began to look at themselves and their place in the universe in a more objective light.

Since the beginning of the scientific revolution, believers have had to reconcile their beliefs with science. This has always proved difficult. If an all-perfect God created the universe and its physical laws, why would he have to step in to perform miracles and answer prayers? If, as all the evidence indicates, the universe, including humans and their brains, is matter and nothing more, how can we possibly live forever? Theologians try hard, but never come up with satisfactory answers.

We show that plane hyperbolic geometry, expressed in terms of points and the ternary relation of collinearity alone, cannot be expressed by means of axioms of complexity at most ∀∃∀, but that there is an axiom system, all of whose axioms are ∀∃∀∃ sentences. This remains true for Klingenberg's generalized hyperbolic planes, with arbitrary ordered fields as coordinate fields.

We provide a quantifier-free axiom system for plane hyperbolic geometry in a language containing only absolute geometrically meaningful ternary operations (in the sense that they have the same interpretation in Euclidean geometry as well). Each axiom contains at most 4 variables. It is known that there is no axiom system for plane hyperbolic consisting of only prenex 3-variable axioms. Changing one of the axioms, one obtains an axiom system for plane Euclidean geometry, expressed in the same language, all of whose (...) axioms are also at most 4-variable universal sentences. We also provide an axiom system for plane hyperbolic geometry in Tarski's language L B which might be the simplest possible one in that language. (shrink)

Reverse analyses of three proofs of the Sylvester-Gallai theorem lead to three different and incompatible axiom systems. In particular, we show that proofs respecting the purity of the method, using only notions considered to be part of the statement of the theorem to be proved, are not always the simplest, as they may require axioms which proofs using extraneous predicates do not rely upon.

All the social sciences are now in flux and Soviet studies even more so. Many traditional approaches prove to be useless for understanding the changed world and there is a search for new explanatory models, and even for “alternative organizing myths.” All this fosters confusion and during such periods of “paradigm change” debates assume predictable characteristics. First of all, there appears a large gap between, in John Stuart Mill's words, “the meaning which a term bears in common acceptation” and that (...) which the writer “intends to annex to it.” It provides a great opportunity for sniping and passionately accusing opponents of lack of conceptual rigor. (shrink)

In the Spanish-Indian controversies, special attention was given to the subject of the education of the Indians, understood in a first approach as the necessary procedure to enable them to overcome their barbarianism, that is, to better adapt themselves to the natural law. This generated a philosophy of education which, in spite of being directly inspired by the circumstances of the Indians, nonetheless had permanent value by virtue of its anthropological soundness and its classical approach. This article deals with the (...) notions of barbarianism, education, natural law, and their interplay in the educational works of Bartolomé de las Casas and José de Acosta. (shrink)

Certain distinctively patristic and medieval features may be traced in Spanish-Renaissance thought, a tradition in which Aristotelianism played an otherwise dominant role. The study of these features may help to better understand the place of Hispanic thought in Renaissance intellectual history. I focus on one such a feature, providentialism, as it can be seen in two representative authors of sixteenth-century Spanish historiography. By discussing their differing providentialist views, and their motives for adopting them in each author’s historical and political circumstances, (...) it is argued that the zeal for justice constitutes a distinctive trait of Spanish-Renaissance thought. (shrink)

Se presenta la fase inicial de una investigación que trata la despoblación como tema controversial desde una perspectiva interdisciplinar y tratando de identificar el valor de la Historia para el conocimiento de esta temática. Esta primera fase se plantea desde un cuestionario destinado a identificar la percepción del alumnado de Segundo curso de ESO sobre el aprendizaje de la Historia y su relación con temas del presente, su percepción sobre la despoblación y su opinión sobre tópicos. En este artículo se (...) analizan tres preguntas del cuestionario para identificar si existen diferentes percepciones en el ámbito urbano y rural y también entre centros y su ubicación. Mediante un análisis mixto se plantea la detección de diferencias de percepción tanto entre el alumnado de las ciudades de Segovia y Madrid como entre cada uno de los centros. (shrink)

Das Thema dieser Abhandlung ist die Begründung der Giltigkeit von Aussagen, 1. von Erkenntnis, 2. von Normen, 3. von Werturteilen. Giltigkeit bedeutet anerkannt-werdensollen. Dazu muß das Verhältnis von Sollen und Sein in einer neuen Weise bestimmt werden. 1. Die Begründung der Giltigkeit von Aussagen einer Erkenntnis rein gedanklicher Sachverhalte erfolgt durch die Logik bei Festsetzung von Axiomen. Die Aussagen von Wirklichkeitserkenntnis sind teils solche von subjektiven Erlebnissen, teils solche über eine objektive Wirklichkeit. Die Giltigkeitsbegründung erfolgt dadurch, daß die Übereinstimmung des (...) ausgesagten Sachverhaltes mit der Wirklichkeit bei den ersteren unmittelbar, bei den letzteren mittelbar festgestellt wird. Für die Begründung von Aussagen über objektive Wirklichkeit sind außerdem noch zwei Voraussetzungen erforderlich: die einer unbeschränkten Gesetzmäßigkeit und die einer Wirklichkeit außer den Erlebnissen. Die Giltigkeit dieser Voraussetzungen, die über die erlebten Erfahrungen grundsätzlich hinausgehen, beruht auf ihrer Unentbehrlichkeit für eine Theorie, nach der sich die Erlebnisse aus gesetzmäßigen Bedingungen ableiten lassen. 2. Die Giltigkeit von Normen beruht teils auf Festsetzung und ist dann nur eine beschränkt allgemeine, teils auf Bedingungen für die Erreichung von Absichten und kann dann unbeschränkt allgemein sein, wenn die Absichten allgemein sind, wie hinsichtlich der Ordnung, der Grundlage der Logik, und bei der Moral. 3. Die Giltigkeit von Werturteilen, sofern sie unpersönliche sind, wird durch ihre logische Ableitung aus Wertungsgrundsätzen und Tatsachenaussagen begründet. Die Wertungsgrundsätze werden entweder durch Festsetzung aufgestellt, dann haben sie nur eine beschränkte Allgemeingiltigkeit, oder sie werden durch die Konstituenten der Kultur gegeben, dann sind sie unbeschränkt allgemeingiltig. (shrink)